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State Constitutional Law: The Right of Privacy
and Same-Sex Marriage
Jeffrey M Shaman*
The right of privacy is a broad concept, used in diverse contexts to
refer to a variety of claims or entitlements.' One of the more significant
branches of the right of privacy concerns the right of an individual to
make personal decisions about his or her life free from government
control; that is, the right of individual autonomy. The right of individual
autonomy or privacy potentially may encompass matters such as the right
to marry, the right to have a family, the right of reproductive freedom,
the right to ingest substances, the right to refuse medical treatment, the
right to physician-assisted suicide, the right to cohabitation, and the right
2of intimate association.
The concept of privacy or autonomy often is used interchangeably
with the concept of liberty, both referring to a fundamental right of self-
determination. The right of privacy is based on the principle that "a
person belongs to himself and not [to] others."3 It embodies a sense of
personhood-an "autonomy of self that should remain free from
intrusion or coercion by society or the government.5 It comprehends that
there are certain personal decisions concerning one's life that an
* Vincent de Paul Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. By permission of
Oxford University Press, Inc., portions of this article are reprinted from: JEFFREY M. SHAMAN,
EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
1. The main branches of the state constitutional right of privacy are: (1) the right to be free
from unreasonable government surveillance; (2) the right to prevent the collection or dissemination
of personal information; and (3) the right of individual autonomy. JENNIFER FRIESEN, 1 STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 2.01 (4th ed.
2006). The focus of this Article is on the right of individual autonomy. It also should be noted that
in the context of the law of torts, the right of privacy refers to: (1) intrusion into a person's private
affairs; (2) public disclosure of non-newsworthy information about an individual; (3) publicity that
places an individual in a false light; and (4) appropriation of an individual's name or likeness. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
2. See 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 652 (2009).
3. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 288,
288-89 (1977)), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
4. The phrase "autonomy of self' is from Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
5. See, e.g., id. at 578-79.
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individual should be able to make for oneself free from interference by
the state.6 Flowing from respect for personal dignity, the right of privacy
allows an individual to define his or her own life.
The right of privacy has developed primarily through decisions of
the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Constitution.
Over the years the Supreme Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution to formulate an evolving right of privacy that
encompasses certain family rights, reproductive rights, and, most
recently, a right of intimate association. Yet the Court has placed
definitive limits on family and reproductive rights and also has refused to
extend the right of privacy to other areas. 9 There is scant agreement
among the justices of the Supreme Court concerning the right of privacy
and at times the high Court's commitment to privacy has wavered
considerably.10 As a result of the Court's continuing equivocation in this
area, the scope of the right of privacy under the Federal Constitution is
considerably uncertain.
Given this uncertainty, it was hardly surprising when a number of
states stepped into the breach to revitalize the right of privacy. State
constitutions, after all, are an important source of protection for
individual rights and liberties, including the right of privacy. Indeed,
state constitutions contain various provisions that can be used to protect
the right of privacy. Many state constitutions contain due process or
law-of-the-land clauses safeguarding liberty that have been interpreted to
ensure the right of privacy." Similarly, state constitutional provisions
that deny the existence of arbitrary power over individual liberty have
6. See, e.g., id.
7. See John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal
Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation ofState Rights Derivedfrom Federal Sources, 3
EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 195, 201-05 (1990).
Though the concept of privacy in general has deep roots in state law, the right of
"constitutional" privacy in the Griswold sense was originally developed by federal courts
construing the federal Constitution and only thereafter adopted by state constitutional
amenders and state courts as a matter of state constitutional law. In no state did there
exist any independent pre-Griswold tradition of constitutional protection for interests of
this type. Thus all states which currently protect such rights do so through some process
of adoption, explicit or implicit, from federal sources.
Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
8. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125-36 (2008).
9. See id.
10. See id at 135-36.
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 501-02 (Ky. 1992).
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been construed to protect the right of privacy.12  State constitutional
provisions guaranteeing equality also are used as a means of protection
for the right of privacy. 3  In some states, a right of privacy has been
found implicit in constitutional provisions declaring that "[a]ll persons
are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights"l 4 or stating that "[t]he enumeration of rights in this
constitution shall not be construed to deny and impair others retained by,
and inherent in, the people." 5 In modem times, five states-Alaska,
California, Florida, Hawaii, and Montana-have amended their
constitutions to expressly protect the right of privacy.' 6  These express
provisions provide fertile ground for the recognition of expansive
privacy rights, but even where only a more general constitutional
provision-such as a due process clause-is available as a source of
protection for privacy, some states have been willing to countenance
expansive privacy rights."
In recent years, as claims have been made to expand the right of
autonomy to new dimensions, the states have differed in their willingness
to do so. Some state courts have moved forward to expand the right of a
woman to choose to have an abortion,'8 while others have declined to
take that course.' 9 A number of state courts have recognized the right of
intimate association and struck down sodomy laws well before the
Supreme Court was willing to do so, 20 while other state courts chose to
stand fast with the then prevailing federal approach rebuffing the right of
intimate association.2 1 A number of state courts have faced the issue of
same-sex marriage or civil union and have reached various conclusions
concerning it.2 2 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts became a pioneer
by being the first judicial body in the nation to rule that the right of
privacy secured by the state constitution encompassed a right to same-
12. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990).
13. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 148 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
14. N.J. CONST. art. I, 1 1.
15. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 32.
16. See RANDY J. HOLLAND, STEPHEN R. MCALLISTER, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, & JEFFREY S.
SurroN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE 256 (2010).
17. See SHAMAN, supra note 8, at 158-62.
18. See, e.g., In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1194-96 (Fla. 1989); Planned Parenthood of Middle
Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 25 (Tenn. 2000).
19. See, e.g., Reprod. Health Serv. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon,
185 S.W.3d 685, 691-92 (Mo. 2006).
20. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 501-02 (Ky. 1992).
21. See, e.g., State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986).
22. See HOLLAND, MCALLISTER, SHAMAN, & SUTrON, supra note 16, at 331-32.
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sex marriage. 2 3 Some twenty-eight years before that, the Supreme Court
of Alaska pioneered a different sort of privacy by ruling that the state
constitutional guarantee of privacy afforded a right to possess marijuana
for personal use in the privacy of one's home.24 The states have long
recognized-first under the common law and later as an aspect of the
constitutional right of privacy-a right of bodily integrity which
comprehends the right of an individual to refuse medical treatment even
if doing so will hasten death.25 The states have drawn the line, however,
at physician-assisted suicide, which has never been considered a
common law right or a constitutional one, although Oregon and
Washington have enacted statutes legalizing physician-assisted suicide.26
Thus, considerable variation, not to mention controversy, exists
concerning the parameters of the right of privacy in state constitutional
law.
State constitutional conceptions of privacy independent of the federal
model began to emerge at a relatively early date. In 1909, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky decided Commonwealth v. Campbell, which
conceived a theory of individual autonomy remarkably advanced for its
time.27 In Campbell, the court ruled that an ordinance that criminalized
possession of intoxicating liquor-even for private use-violated the
Kentucky Bill of Rights.28 The court's opinion in Campbell adopted the
principle that the legislature has no authority to restrict the liberty of an
individual except where his or her conduct will cause some injury to the
public. 2 9 This precept, the court suggested, flows from the state Bill of
Rights, which declares that seeking safety and happiness is an inalienable
right and that the state cannot possess arbitrary power over the lives,
liberty, or property of its citizens.30 Quoting liberally from the works of
John Stuart Mill, the court incorporated that philosopher's principle that
in a just society the only purpose for which power may rightfully be
exercised over an individual against his or her will is to prevent harm to
others.3 ' Therefore, the state has no right to compel an individual to do
23. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003).
24. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511-12 (Alaska 1975).
25. See SHAMAN, supra note 8, at 229-31.
26. See id. at 231-35; see also Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 127.800-127.995 (West 2003 & West Supp. 2010); Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245 (West Supp. 2011).
27. 117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
28. Id. at 387.
29. Id. at 386.
30. Id. at 385.
31. Id at 386.
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or forbear from doing something merely because others believe it is for
the individual's own good. As the court put it, "what a man shall eat and
wear, or drink or think" is beyond the authority of the state to regulate.32
The ruling in Campbell was an exceptional occurrence, departing
from the generally accepted view in other states. Although courts during
that period frequently extolled the virtues of individual liberty, the
predominant rule was that individual liberty could be regulated in any
way necessary to promote the general welfare, and this was so even
though the conduct subject to regulation did not directly harm other
persons.33 Even in Kentucky, the ruling in Campbell would be forgotten
for decades before being revived in 1992 to have a stunning impact in the
case of Commonwealth v. Wasson, in which the Kentucky Supreme
Court struck down a criminal sodomy statute on the ground that it
violated the right of privacy.34 When Wasson was decided, the
prevailing precedent in the federal realm was Bowers v. Hardwick, a
1986 Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a
Georgia criminal law prohibiting sodomy and ruling that the right of
privacy does not encompass the right of a consenting adult to engage in
homosexual conduct, even in the privacy of his or her home.
Eventually the high Court would end up apologizing for its decision in
Bowers and would unceremoniously overrule it in Lawrence v. Texas.36
But it would take seventeen years for the Court to do so, and in the
meantime, a number of state courts would step into the breach by turning
to their state constitutions to protect the right of intimate association and
to strike down laws making sodomy a crime.3 7 In fact, those state
decisions would play a role in convincing the Supreme Court that its
decision in Bowers had been in error and should be overruled.38
In Wasson, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that a statute
making it a crime to engage in sexual activity with a person of the same
sex violated the right of individual liberty guaranteed by the Kentucky
Constitution and the right of equal treatment also guaranteed by the
32. Id. at 387.
33. See, e.g., Eidge v. City of Bessemer, 51 So. 246, 252 (Ala. 1909); State v. Williams, 61 S.E.
61, 64 (N.C. 1908); Ex Parte Brown, 42 S.W. 554, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897); State v. Gilman, 10
S.E. 283, 284 (W.V. 1889).
34. 842 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Ky. 1992).
35. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
36. 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
37. See SHAMAN, supra note 8, at 216-21.




Kentucky Constitution.3 9 The court proclaimed in Wasson that the right
of privacy had deep historical roots dating back to the 1891 Kentucky
Constitution.40 Similarly, in striking down sodomy statutes, courts in
other states found a strong historic commitment to the right of privacy in
their state constitutions.4 1
The decision in Wasson certainly was groundbreaking, as was the
1999 decision of the Supreme Court of Vermont in Baker v. State.42 In
Baker, the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled that by excluding same-sex
couples from the benefits and protections of marriage, the state marriage
law violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution,
which prohibits special emoluments or advantages that are not shared in
common by the entire community.43 While ruling that same-sex couples
were entitled to the same benefits and protections afforded to opposite-
sex couples, the court decided to leave it to the legislature to resolve
exactly how those benefits and protections should be extended to same-
sex couples.4 4 This gave the Vermont legislature a number of options,
one of which was to enact a domestic partnership statute to establish an
alternative legal status to marriage for same-sex couples.45 In response to
the decision in Baker, the legislature in Vermont initially enacted a
statute authorizing civil unions for persons of the same sex.4 6 Nine years
later, the Vermont legislature passed a bill allowing same-sex marriage.47
When the bill was vetoed by the governor, the legislature overrode the
veto and the law went into effect.4 8 So, Vermont became the first state to
recognize same-sex civil unions49 and also the first state to approve
39. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491-92.
40. Id. at 491-97.
41. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 346-50 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d
18, 21-22 (Ga. 1998); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 260-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966),
abrogated by Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 853 (Tenn. 2008).
42. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
43. Id. at 867.
44. Id
45. Id.
46. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (West 2007 & West Supp. 2010).




49. See Courtney Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to Be Named: Moving Beyond Race to Explain
Why 'Separate' Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be 'Equal', 97 GEO.
L.J. 1155, 1163 n.36 (2009).
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same-sex marriage through legislative enactment rather than a court
order.o
The decision of the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker extended the
legal benefits of marriage, but not the right to marry itself, to same-sex
couples. In other words, the decision mandated the extension of
something short of marriage--civil union or domestic partnership-to
gay or lesbian couples. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
however, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts went a decisive step
further, ruling that under the Massachusetts Constitution, the
Commonwealth could not deny the right to marry to persons of the same
sex.5 1 Marriage, the court observed, is extremely important to
individuals; in fact, it is one of the most important intimate or personal
aspects of an individual's life.52 As the court explained:
Marriage also bestows enormous private and social advantages on
those who choose to marry. . . . "It is an association that promotes a
way of life" .... Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven,
and connection that express our common humanity ... the decision
whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of
self-definition.53
The court noted that tangible as well as intangible benefits flow from
marriage. The legal status of marriage brings with it valuable property
rights and other benefits, a number of which the court enumerated in its
opinion. 54 As the court described, "[t]he benefits accessible only by way
of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life
and death."" Given the many concrete benefits of marriage as well as its
"intimately personal significance,"5 6 the United States Supreme Court
and several state supreme courts have recognized that it is a basic civil
right "fundamental to our very existence and survival."5  Without the
right to choose to marry, a person "is excluded from the full range of
human experience and denied full protection of the laws."5 Because
50. David D. Meyer, Fragmentation and Consolidation in the Law of Marriage and Same-Sex
Relationships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 115, 125 (2010).
51. 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
52. Id. at 957.
53. Id. at 954-55 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
54. Id. at 955-56.
55. Id. at 955.
56. Id. at 957.




civil marriage is integral to the lives of individuals as well as to the
welfare of the community, the law assiduously safeguards the right of an
individual to marry against undue government incursion.
The court also pointed out that for centuries in the United States,
white and black Americans were prohibited by law from marrying, but
that long history did not avail when the Supreme Court of California
struck down a prohibition of interracial marriage in 1948 in Perez v.
Sharp or when the United States Supreme Court struck down an anti-
miscegenation law in 1967 in Loving v. Virginia.59  Comparing the
Massachusetts law barring same-sex marriage to the anti-miscegenation
laws struck down in Perez and Loving, the court stated:
In this case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives individuals of
access to an institution of fundamental legal, personal, and social
significance-the institution of marriage-because of a single trait:
skin color in Perez and Loving, sexual orientation here. As it did in
Perez and Loving, history must yield to a more fully developed
understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination.
Given the importance to individuals and the personal nature of the
right to marry, the Commonwealth was unable to convince the court that
there was any justification for prohibiting same-sex marriage. The
Commonwealth argued that the prohibition of same-sex marriage was
justified in order to encourage procreation and child-rearing within the
institution of marriage.' In rejecting that argument, the court noted that
the Massachusetts laws of marriage "do not privilege procreative
heterosexual intercourse between married people above every other form
of adult intimacy and every other means of creating a family."6 2 There
was no requirement that applicants for a marriage license attest to their
ability or intention to conceive children through intercourse." Fertility
was not a condition of marriage, nor lack of it a ground for divorce. 4
People who never consummate their marriage and never plan to are
nonetheless still married. While many married couples have children
together, "it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage
partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua
59. Id. at 958 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. 1; Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948)).
60. Id. (footnote omitted).
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non of civil marriage."6 6 Furthermore, the court noted that "the
Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates bringing children into a family
regardless of whether the intended parent is married or unmarried,
whether the child is adopted or born into a family, whether assistive
technology was used to conceive the child, and whether the parent or her
partner is heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual."6 7 Thus, the attempt to
isolate procreation as the source of a fundamental right to marry
overlooks the complex nature of marriage and its relationship to
autonomy, family, and child rearing:
The "marriage is procreation" argument singles out the one
unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples,
and transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage. . .. In
so doing, the [Commonwealth's] action confers an official stamp of
approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are
inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relations and are not
worthy of respect.68
The Commonwealth further asserted that the prohibition of same-sex
marriage served the purpose of ensuring that children are raised in an
optimal setting, which the Commonwealth defined as "a two-parent
family with one parent of each sex."6 In response, the court readily
admitted that protecting the welfare of children was a paramount state
policy, but nonetheless concluded that restricting marriage to opposite-
sex couples "cannot plausibly further" the policy of protecting children.70
The composition of families varies greatly from household to household,
and Massachusetts "has moved vigorously to strengthen the modem
family in its many variations."7 1 There was no evidence that forbidding
same-sex marriage increases the number of couples who enter into
opposite-sex marriages to have children.72 Thus, there was no "rational
relationship" between the marriage statute and the purported rationale of
protecting the "optimal" child-rearing unit.73 The Commonwealth
conceded: "Same-sex couples may be 'excellent' parents. [Same-sex]
couples ... have children for the same reasons others do-to love them,
66. Id.
67. Id. at 962.
68. Id.
69. Id at 961.
70. Id at 962.





to care for them, to nurture them." 74 However, child rearing by same-sex
couples was made infinitely more difficult by "their status as outliers to
the marriage laws."75 Children of same-sex couples were deprived of
significant marital benefits that bring financial security to all members of
a family.76 So the marriage laws actually worked at cross-purposes to the
state's goal of enhancing the welfare of children; the exclusion of same-
sex couples from marriage did nothing to benefit the children of
opposite-sex marriages, while denying children of same-sex couples
immeasurable benefits that ensue from a stable family structure. As the
court concluded, "[i]t cannot be rational under our laws, and indeed it is
not permitted, to penalize children by depriving them of State benefits
because the State disapproves of their parents' sexual orientation."
The Commonwealth also argued that the expansion of marriage to
include same-sex couples would lead to interstate conflict.7 9 In response,
the court stated:
[C]onsiderations of comity [should not] prevent us from according
Massachusetts residents the full measure of protection available under
the Massachusetts Constitution. The genius of our Federal system is
that each State's Constitution has vitality specific to its own traditions,
and that, subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment, each State is free to address difficult issues of individual
liberty in the manner its own Constitution demands.80
Finally, the court pointed out that many of the justifications that the
Commonwealth had advanced in support of the marriage law were
"starkly at odds with the comprehensive network of vigorous, gender-
neutral laws promoting stable families and the best interests of
children." 8 Moreover, "the marriage ban works a deep and scarring
hardship on a very real segment of the community for no rational
reason." 82 Given "the absence of any reasonable relationship" between
the marriage ban and any legitimate state interest, the court could only




77. Id. at 964.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 967.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 968.
82. Id.
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against ... homosexual[s]."a Therefore, the court ruled that the
Massachusetts law prohibiting same-sex marriage was a violation of "the
basic premises of individual liberty and equality under law protected by
the Massachusetts Constitution." 84
Sometime after the decision in Goodridge, the Massachusetts
legislature requested an advisory opinion from the Massachusetts
Supreme Court concerning a bill pending before the legislature that
would allow civil unions for same-sex couples but prohibit same-sex
marriage.85 In response, the court issued an opinion declaring that civil
union was not an adequate substitute for civil marriage and that to
continue to disallow same-sex marriage would be a violation of the state
constitution. 8 6 In other words, nothing short of marriage itself for same-
sex couples would suffice to comply with the court's ruling in
Goodridge. In the court's eyes, there was a wide gulf between civil
union and civil marriage, a "dissimilitude" that was far from innocuous
and that had the effect of assigning same-sex couples to "second-class
status."8 The bill in question purported to make civil union parallel to,
yet separate from, civil marriage, leading the court to observe that
"separate is seldom, if ever, equal."8 8 By excluding same-sex couples
from civil marriage, the bill would have the effect of maintaining and
fostering "a stigma of exclusion that the Constitution prohibits."89
Immediately after the decision in Goodridge, there were calls to
amend the Massachusetts Constitution to counteract the court's ruling,
and at first it appeared that the Massachusetts legislature was determined
to do exactly that.90 Initially the legislature voted to amend the state
constitution to ban same-sex marriage but allow civil unions.91
However, to amend the Massachusetts Constitution, the legislature must
re-approve a measure a second time and then submit it to a statewide
vote before it may go into effect. 9 2 After the initial vote approving the
amendment, the Commonwealth's legislature had a change of heart,
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004).
86. Id. at 572.
87. Id. at 570.
88. Id. at 569.
89. Id. at 570.
90. See Roderick L. Ireland, In Goodridge's Wake: Reflections on the Political, Public, and
Personal Repercussions of the Massachusetts Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1417,
1423 (2010).
91. See id.
92. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII.
757
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
rejecting efforts to amend the constitution to prohibit same-sex
marriage.9 3 In 2007, the legislature voted 151 to 45 against the proposed
constitutional amendment, which needed 50 favorable votes to be
presented to the voters in a referendum. 9 4  So same-sex marriage
remained valid in Massachusetts and continues to be performed there. In
fact, since May 2004, when same-sex couples began to marry in
Massachusetts, thousands of same-sex marriages have been performed in
the Commonwealth every year.95
Since the decision in Goodridge, a number of other state supreme
courts have addressed the issue of same-sex marriage, with varying
results. Some state high courts, in disagreement with Goodridge, have
found nothing unconstitutional about laws limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples. In New York, the state's highest court ruled that the state
domestic relations laws disallowing same-sex marriage violated neither
the due process nor equal protection clause of the New York
Constitution.9 6 Applying rational basis review to the domestic relation
law, the court found that the prohibition of same-sex marriage was a
permissible means of promoting stable family relationships. The court
also stated: "The Legislature could rationally believe that it is better,
other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and
a father." 9 8 Several other state courts, similarly applying rational basis
review, have upheld laws disallowing same-sex marriage.9 9
In other states, however, courts, in agreement with Goodridge, have
struck down laws precluding same-sex marriage. In Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health, the Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled
that the state statutory prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the
principle of equal protection of law guaranteed by the state
constitution.'00 In recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, the court
declared:
93. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Gay Marriage Referendum Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2007, at A6.
94. Id.
95. See Abby Goodnough & John Schwartz, Judge Topples US. Rejection of Gay Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2010, at Al (counting over 15,000 same-sex marriages since 2004).
96. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10, 12 (N.Y. 2006).
97. Id. at 6-7.
98. Id. at 7.
99. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 27-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 932
A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006).
100. 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008).
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Interpreting our state constitutional provisions in accordance with
firmly established equal protection principles leads inevitably to the
conclusion that gay persons are entitled to marry the otherwise
qualified same sex partner of their choice. To decide otherwise would
require us to apply one set of constitutional principles to gay persons
and another to all others. The guarantee of equal protection under the
law, and our obligation to uphold that command, forbids us from doing
so. In accordance with these state constitutional requirements, same
sex couples cannot be denied the freedom to marry.lo0
In California, the state supreme court ruled that state laws precluding
same-sex marriage violated the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution,102 but that decision was nullified by a constitutional
amendment, Proposition 8, adopted by the electorate stating that "[o]nly
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California."10 3  However, Proposition 8 was subsequently found to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution by a
federal district court in California.1' That decision is now on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,105 and is expected eventually to wind
up being decided by the nation's highest court.106 More recently in Iowa,
after the state supreme court unanimously recognized a right to same-sex
marriage, 07 three justices of the court who faced the electorate in a
retention election were voted off the bench.'08 This unprecedented vote
was the result of a well-financed campaign directed by out-of-state
organizations opposed to gay marriagel09-a campaign that some
observers view as a serious threat to judicial independence and the
willingness of judges to protect minority rights."0
101. Id. at 482 (footnotes omitted).
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It is important to note that the legalization of same-sex marriage,
whether through court ruling or legislative action, pertains only to civil
marriage, which is a secular institution governed, as it always has been,
by civil law.111 While civil marriage is governed by state law, religions
remain free to choose what marriages they will or will not sanctify and
may continue to define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman. 112 It should be mentioned that not all religions reject same-sex
marriage; Quakers, Unitarians, Buddhists, as well as Reform and
Reconstructionist Jews recognize same-sex unions.1 13  But however a
particular religion may define marriage for its own purposes, the fact
remains that civil marriage is a secular institution governed exclusively
by secular law.
At the present time, same-sex marriage is permitted in five states as
well as the District of Columbia,l 14 while nine additional states allow
same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships. 15 On the other hand,
thirty-six states have enacted statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage and
thirty of those states have adopted constitutional amendments barring
same-sex marriage." 6  Thus, in the realm of state constitutionalism, the
right of privacy continues its evolutionary course.1 17
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112. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 906.
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Perspective, 96 GEO. L.J. 2103, 2108 (2008). Moreover, within religions that reject same-sex
marriage, there are adherents and clergy who support such unions. For example, "[i]n 2004, almost
500 clergy from eighteen faith traditions signed a 'Religious Declaration for the Freedom of Same
Sex Couples to Marry,' stating that they 'oppose appeals to sacred texts and religious traditions for
the purpose of denying legal equality to same-gender couples."' Id. at 2109.
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